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n When the State speaks, What Should It Say?, Corey 
Brettschneider aims to resolve the dilemma opposing two 
conceptions of the role of the liberal and democratic state in 
addressing hateful and/or discriminatory beliefs and practices: the 
Invasive State, on the one hand, and the Hateful Society, on the 
other. At one extreme, the Invasive State coerces its subjects by 
prohibiting the expression of certain discriminatory viewpoints 
that are inconsistent with the ideal of free and equal citizenship. 
‘Prohibitionists’ would therefore use coercion to promote 
democratic values and thereby ‘promote equality as its expense.’1 
In the Hateful Society, in contrast, ‘neutralists’ protect the 
expression of all opinions and may leave deeply discriminatory 
beliefs and practices ‘thrive in a culture of rights’2 and thereby 
make the state complicit in those beliefs and practices. 
Faced with such dilemma, Brettschneider defends an 
alternative model, ‘value democracy’, which aims to avoid the 
‘dystopias’ of coercion or neutrality. Rather than attempting to 
!
1 Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How 
Democracies Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), p. 168. 
2 Ibid. 
I 
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change beliefs and practices by coercing individuals, the state and 
the citizenry should engage in ‘democratic persuasion’ by 
criticizing discriminatory beliefs and practices and persuade them 
to adopt the founding values of freedom and equality. The state’s 
duty of democratic persuasion does not face the justificatory 
burden of both the ‘prohibitionists’ and the ‘neutralists’ because it 
is met by the expressive and not coercive capacities of the state. 
Democratic persuasion has the advantage that the state and the 
citizenry actively and publicly defend the ‘reasons for rights’ (free 
and equal citizenship) without limiting those rights. 
In this article, I aim to test Brettschneider’s value democracy at 
the supranational level. To specify what I mean by 
‘supranational’, it is necessary to concentrate on one central state 
actor bearing the duty of democratic persuasion, namely courts. 
Indeed, Brettschneider assigns a central expressive role to courts 
in ‘promulgating the reasons for rights.’3 While no single state 
institution holds a monopoly on the expression of those reasons, 
the opinion of courts is a central and concrete requirement of 
value democracy. The courts’ expressive function helps to resolve 
the tension between the interest of speakers and listeners in 
viewpoint neutral protections and the interest of the citizenry in 
ensuring that democratic values are publicly expressed and hateful 
views are combatted. Courts are generally asked to give reasons 
for their judgments, but they not are assigned the specific duty of 
democratic persuasion that their subjects deserve to know the 
reasons that underlie their legally protected rights. 
Throughout the book, Brettschneider focuses on prominent 
cases at the U.S Supreme Court—an ‘exemplar of public 
reason’4—either to illustrate its expressive role or to critically 
examine some predominant jurisprudence. In Europe, in contrast, 
!
3 Ibid., p. 82. 
4 Ibid. 
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it is no longer possible to examine domestic courts without 
addressing the role of supranational courts. This is surely valid for 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter, the CJEU) 
established by the European Union (hereafter, the EU) but also 
for the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter, the 
Strasbourg Court), established by the Council of Europe (CoE), 
which adjudicates the civil and political rights enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter, the 
Convention). In supervising the implementation of the 
Convention and reviewing the domestic legislation (statutory 
provisions, case law, or executive acts) of forty-seven European 
state parties to the Convention, the Court bas become of utmost 
importance to the protection of basic human rights of more than 
800 million people.  
While it cannot ‘strike down’ domestic laws but only ‘declare’ 
the conformity of domestic law to the Convention, the 
Strasbourg Court can be qualified as ‘supranational’ based on its 
interpretive authority: it holds the final say over the 
interpretation—hence the content—of the Convention’s rights 
(Article 46). Not only are the state parties to the Convention 
legally bound by the Court’s judgments since the entry into force 
of Protocol 11 in 1998.5 A vast majority of state parties also 
routinely attribute the Court’s judgments direct effect in the 
domestic legal order implying that those judgments are directly 
!
5 The introduction of Protocol 11 amounts to the ‘full judicialization’ of the 
Court. It contains three major reforms: first, the old European Commission of 
Human Rights and its screening role is abolished. Second, the Court becomes 
a full-time judicial organ in charge of all the tasks previously performed by the 
Commission. Third, both the rights of individual petition and the acceptance 
of the Court jurisdiction become compulsory. For an overview, see Robert 
Harmsen, ‘The Reform of the Convention System’, in The European Court of 
Human Rights Between Law and Politics, eds. Jonas Christoffersen and Mikael Rask 
Madsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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invocable before any public institution (legislative, executive, 
judicial) without any legislative step.6 This makes the Court rather 
unique among international courts in general and among human 
rights courts in particular. The conjunction between its 
concentration on basic civil and political rights and its supreme 
interpretive role lays down a fertile terrain for an application of 
value democracy.  
By ‘testing’ Brettschneider’s argument at the European level, I 
aim first to show (in Section 3) how the Court has expressed the 
‘reasons for rights’ in a way that mirrors Brettschneider’s moral 
duty of democratic persuasion assigned to domestic courts. 
Rather than merely inducing the level of rights protection based 
on an existing consensus among state parties to the Convention, 
the Court has adopted a so-called ‘teleological’ approach that 
amounts to specifying, in substantive terms, the role that each 
right ought to play in a ‘democratic society.’ This approach 
applies most clearly to the Articles 8—11 of the Convention 
(privacy, conscience and religion, expression, assembly and 
association). This promulgation is not only necessary because 
those rights are in principle derogable—the Court being required 
to examine whether the interference with one or more rights was 
nevertheless ‘necessary in a democratic society.’7 As I shall 
!
6 This attribution of direct effect thereby goes beyond the strict legal obligation 
of state parties to Convention. As Polakiewicz explains, according to the 
Court, instead of imposing an obligation to give direct effect to the substantive 
provisions of the Convention, article 13 of the ECHR only guarantees the 
availability at the national level of an effective remedy to enforce the substance 
of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to 
be secured (…).’ In Jörg Polakiewicz, ‘The Status of the Convention in 
National Law’, in Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR and Its Member States 
1950-2000, eds. Robert Blackburn and Jörg Polakiewicz (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 32. 
7 ‘Necessity in a democratic society’ includes ‘the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
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explain, this promulgation is the strongest in affirming what it 
takes to be the foundations of a ‘democratic society.’ The main 
implication is that the Court leaves no margin of appreciation to 
the respondent state party when such values are at stake. 
To illustrate this point, I reconstruct (Section 3.1.) the Court’s 
reasons for extending the scope of freedom of expression (Article 
10) ‘not only to information or ideas that are favourably received 
or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also 
to those that offend, shock or disturb’ find a place in the public 
arena.’8 This established principle derives from what the Court 
considers essential to a ‘democratic society’, namely ‘pluralism’—
a notion that has constantly helped the Court to fix the limits of 
all the derogable rights. In my view, the waves of duties required 
to meet the Court’s demand of pluralism echoes Brettschneider’s 
attachment to the interest of speakers and listeners in viewpoint 
neutral protections. However, while the Court tolerates the 
expression of those views, it explicitly affirms that they violate the 
Convention’s founding values—and thereby meets its expressive 
and affirmative duty. I illustrative this role in the case of the 
public defense of Sharia law in Turkey. The Court’s explicit 
affirmation can be viewed as an instance of democratic 
persuasion addressed both to the right-holders (individuals) and 
duty-holders (the respondent state party). However, value 
democracy also allows us to question the Court’s judicial restraint 
on other rights (such as freedom of religion (Article 9) and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, etc..’ The grounds for restriction are identical for Articles 8 –
11. For an overview of their application, see Janneke Gerards and Hanneke 
Senden, ‘The Structure of Fundamental Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 7, no. 4 (2009): pp. 
619–653. 
8 The seminal case is Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 7 
December 1976, §50. 
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privacy (8)) on which the margin of appreciation is more salient. 
Indeed, an important implication of value democracy is that 
religious beliefs and practices should not be exempt from the 
principle of public relevance. I suggest (Section 3.2.) that if the 
Court were to apply value democracy consistently, it should 
significantly revise its established case law. I examine in particular 
the recent case of crucifixes in Italian schools.  
Moreover, if Brettschneider’s value democracy can both 
illuminate the Court’s rights-promulgation and suggest how to 
revise parts of its case law, the practice of international courts can 
also put in question some assumptions of his international model 
of democratic persuasion. In his (regrettably short) conclusive 
chapter (‘Value Democracy at Home and Abroad’), 
Brettschneider considers the implications of the model for 
international law: ‘a second implication of the book’s view is that 
it can also serve as a model for understanding how to promote 
ideals of equality in international law without violating the rights 
of individuals or the rights of states.’9 Interestingly, however, 
Brettschneider seems to defend a more modest account of value 
democracy at the international level: in contrast to the domestic 
level, where courts play a central persuasive function, the mere 
fact of ‘signing the treaty is one way for states to use their 
expressive capacities abroad.’10 Referring mostly to UN human 
rights treaties, Brettscheider assumes that ‘because there is no 
international state that can threaten coercion, international law 
often relies on mechanisms of persuasion.’11  
 
!
9 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, p. 181. 
10 Ibid., 172. 
11 Ibid., 171. 
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This modest account is puzzling. As I explain in Section 4, 
what marks the development of international law over the last 
two decades is the establishment of judicial or quasi-judicial 
institutions protecting individual rights against standard threat(s) 
of their states. Should those institutions (e.g. UN Treaty Bodies, 
the Strasbourg Court, but also the International Criminal Court 
(hereafter, the ICC) and Special Tribunals play the same 
expressive role as constitutional courts? Beyond the question of 
the function of international courts, the question of the content that 
those organs should affirm is pressing. Surprisingly, in 
Brettschneider’s account the central value to be expressed is 
identical to the domestic level: democratic citizenship. The 
extensive corpus of anti-discrimination norms can certainly 
support Brettschneider’s preservation of equality as one founding 
value of international human rights law. But as the predominant 
literature in human rights theory suggests, the same is not 
necessarily true of democracy. I suggest in Section 4.1 that an 
important and intermediary step is missing—one that more 
clearly connects democratic citizenship to human rights. I argue 
that this connection can meaningfully obtain by appealing to a 
variant of what human rights theorists have called the ‘political 
conception’ of human rights in order to sustain a identity between 
the two levels of rights-promulgation: international courts should 
express values by which their state subjects (and the individuals 
those states serve) have reasons to abide domestically qua 
democratic states. With a view to develop value democracy 
further, I finally sketch in Section 4.2 how one can potentially 
apply democratic persuasion to international criminal courts by 
relying on a freedom- and equality-enhancing account of the 
criminal law. This identity thesis is facilitated by the primarily 
declaratory, and therefore non-coercive, function of international 
courts. This account therefore further develops the profoundly 
liberal attachment to persuasion. 
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II 
Courts and the reasons for rights 
The realization of value democracy depends on the expressive 
rather than coercive capacities of state institutions in combatting 
beliefs and practices that are at odds with the values of free and 
equal citizenship. When hateful and/or discriminatory viewpoints 
are expressed, state institutions must, on behalf of the citizens 
they represent, criticize and attempt to change those beliefs and 
practices by persuasion. Affirming the ‘reasons for rights’ is 
thereby crucial to the very possibility of an alternative to the 
Hateful Society and the Invasive State. If state actors remain 
neutral, ‘they fail to answer the challenge that hateful viewpoints 
pose to the core democratic values of freedom and equality.’12 If 
they prohibit the expression of those views (by law), they also fail 
to abide by the reasons why liberal rights are protected in the first 
place, namely the freedom and equality of their subjects. The 
promulgation of the reasons for rights is therefore a moral duty 
based on the deontological status of individuals: ‘these reasons 
appeal to the entitlement of each citizen, whose is subject to 
coercion, to be treated as free and equal.’13 As such, it is a ‘diffuse 
duty incumbent in all state actors and citizens.’14 
Is there nonetheless anything distinctive to the courts’ 
expressive and persuasive role? It seems that there is. Courts have 
a general duty—a legal one—to publicly express reasons for their 
judgments. This duty does not derive from the particular ideal of 
value democracy but from the more general ideal of the rule of 
law. As Brettschneider puts it, ‘the content of law should be 
publicized so that citizens can predict when their actions will be 
!
12 Ibid., p. 72. 
13 Ibid., p. 73. 
14 Ibid., p. 151. 
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sanctioned.’15 This is also the case at the Strasbourg Court in 
reviewing domestic legislation.16 But courts in the Hateful Society 
do not have to give the kind of ‘reasons for rights’ that 
Brettschneiders asks them to give: ‘I would add that citizens 
should not only know their rights and the rules that are set out by 
law; they should also know what the reasons are for these rights 
and legal rules.’17 This is where two distinct duties, one legal-
prudential and one moral-democratic, happily meet. In addition to 
their recognized authority to strike down illegitimate laws, courts 
are particularly well placed to endorse the further explanatory task 
of democratic persuasion, that is, to explain ‘why certain laws are 
legitimate or illegitimate and when it speaks in favor of the values 
of free and equal citizenship.’18 This is even more the case of 
judicial authorities such as the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
Strasbourg Court given their particular position of ultimate 
interpreters of the law. 
Now let us see how value democracy concretely applies in 
judicial practice by quickly recasting Brettschneider’s evaluation 
of two important Supreme Court cases: Virginia v. Black (2003) 
and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Eye v. City of Hielah (1993). I 
choose to concentrate on freedom of expression (in Virginia) and 
freedom of religion (in Lukumi) as this continuum offers us 
!
15 Ibid., p. 82. 
16 The publicity of law is also found in the Strasbourg Court’s criteria of 
legality. As the Court held in Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, ‘the law should be 
accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able to foresee – if need 
be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.’ Sunday Times 
v. United Kingdom (No. 1), App. No. 6538/74, 26 April 1979, §51. For a recent 
case, see e.g. Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, App. No. 
33014/05, 5 May 2011, §65-66. 
17 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, p. 82. 
18 Ibid. 
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strong reasons to criticize the dis-continuum that prevails in the 
Strasbourg Court’s case law. In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme 
Court held that an act of cross burning is to be prohibited if it 
threatens particular individuals with the intention to intimidate. 
Brettschneider suggests—with the support of Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion—to preserve the distinction between threats and 
viewpoints: while the threatening of particular individuals should 
be prohibited, the banning of cross burning without the intention 
to intimidate would imply departing from the core principle of 
‘viewpoint neutrality’ and thereby fail to treat persons as free and 
equal. Indeed, ‘respect is owned not to specific viewpoints per se, 
but to individual citizens.’19  This explains why the act of cross 
burning should not be banned despite that it ‘opposes the 
normative reasons that underlie its legality in the first place.’20 But 
it is not enough to protect this founding principle by enforcing it. 
Courts should ‘emphasize why the act of cross-burning is an 
affront to this ideal (…).’21 If that affirmation is not provided, it 
runs the risk that the meaning of the rights-protection will be 
inverted. Hence the ‘substance-based limit’ according to which 
value democracy only promotes the shared value of free and 
equal citizenship is respected.  
In Lukumi, the councilmen of the city of Hielah (Florida) had 
passed a law that prohibited the religious practice of animal 
sacrifice with particular reference to the Santeria religion. While 
the city’s law may be seen as protecting animal welfare, it did not 
prohibit other forms of animal sacrifice deemed slow or painful. 
What raises Brettschneider’s interest in this case is the kind of 
reasons invoked by the city’s councilmen to pass the law, namely 
the intent to burden the Santeria religion specifically on the basis 
!
19 Ibid., p. 80. 
20 Ibid., p. 86. 
21 Ibid. 
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of their own Christian (and therefore discriminatory) religious 
principles. If the court did just protect the members of the 
Santeria religion, one could conclude that it is ‘neutral and has no 
opinion about religious views.’22 But in conformity with value 
democracy, courts should not only protect liberal rights (in this 
case freedom of religion) but also criticize views that oppose 
equal citizenship (in this case the councilmen’s justification of the 
prohibition), which the Supreme Court did in its decision. 
Brettschneider points out that ‘far from having no opinion about 
all religious beliefs, the Court is protecting one set of religious 
beliefs while criticizing another.’23 One can concretely see here 
how courts can play this double function of both protecting the 
right and expressing the reasons for the right. The ‘means-based 
limit’ requires using the state’s expressive and not coercive 
capacities.  
Let us now view those judicial conclusions through the core 
moral principles of value democracy before turning to the 
European context. The first principle is the one of ‘viewpoint 
neutrality’, according to which rights should protect the 
expression of all opinions and beliefs without discrimination. This 
principle derivees from the interest of individuals to ‘develop 
their own notion of justice and the good’24 illustrated notably in 
Rawls’ ‘two moral powers’ of the person. This applies to the act 
of cross burning in or to the practice of animal sacrifice. The 
individual interest in exercising those two moral powers forms 
the basis for legally protecting liberal rights for all. However, this 
goes for both the Hateful Society and value democracy. For the 
added value of the latter model to emerge, one must more closely 
examines the scope of the state’s duty of viewpoint neutrality: 
!
22 Ibid., p. 147. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p. 79. 
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‘viewpoint neutrality requires that the state not coercively limit 
the free speech, but it does not give the state the obligation to be 
neutral when it comes to the defense and expression of the values 
central to its own legitimacy.’25 As a result, viewpoint neutrality 
leaves a space open – a space that can be occupied by a collective 
interest derived from the same founding values of freedom and 
equality, namely the interest in ‘seeing that the viewpoints 
consistent with the values of free and equal citizenship succeed 
while those inimical to those values fail.’26 Because of its wide 
expressive capacities, the state should use that space to promote 
the values upon which its very legitimacy depends. 
 
III 
The ‘reasons for rights’ 
at the European Court of Human Rights 
Having surveyed Brettschneider’s value democracy in courts 
and traced back to its core principles, I now want to show how 
the model can illuminate an important component of the 
Strasbourg Court’s case law. In order to smoothly switch from 
North American context to the European one, I concentrate on 
the same rights reviewed above, namely freedom of expression 
(Article 10) and freedom of religion (Article 9). Before 
reconstructing the Court’s reasoning, let me mention in more 
general terms how central the value of democracy is to the 
Convention and to the institution from which it emerged, namely 
the CoE. Legal historians are clear that democracy played a 
significant role in supporting the creation of the Convention 
nascent system. More precisely, among the civil society activists 
and politicians in and around the European Movement in 1949, 
!
25 Ibid., p. 80. 
26 Ibid. 
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the priority was to install an intergovernmental ‘alarm bell’27 
system against the return of totalitarian practices while drafting 
states aimed to ‘lock up’28 the democratic process against internal 
opponents. Article 2 of the first draft of the Convention prepared 
by the European Movement in 1948 (before it reached the 
legislative and executive levels of the CoE) required each state 
party ‘faithfully to respect the fundamental principles of 
democracy’ and to proscribe any action ‘which would interfere 
with the right of political criticism and the right to organise a 
political opposition.’29  
This historical point allows me to place another introductory 
remark about interpretation at the Court. It is now widely 
documented how the Court has over the years dismissed most of 
the conventional doctrines of treaty interpretation. That is, rather 
than fixing the level of protection of rights upon state intent 
(intentionalism), upon the ordinary meaning of treaty terms in the 
legal culture of the respondent state party (textualism) or upon an 
!
27 As Bates explains, the Court ‘would be the conscience of the free Europe, 
acting like an ‘alarm bell’ warning the other nations of democratic Europe that 
one of their number was going ‘totalitarian.’ At this stage, then, the human 
rights guarantee was minimalist in its ambition.’ In Ed Bates, ‘The Birth of the 
European Convention on Human Rights-and the European Court of Human 
Rights,’ in Ed Bates, ‘The Birth of the European Convention on Human 
Rights,’ in The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics, ed. Jonas 
Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 19. 
28 In his seminal article, Moravcsik argues that the explanation lies in the state's 
tactic to consolidate democratic institutions vis-à-vis internal political 
opponents in times of uncertainty: ‘sovereignty costs are weighted against 
establishing human rights regimes, whereas greater political stability may be 
weighted in favour of it.’  In Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human 
Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe,’ International 
Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): p. 220. 
29 See European Movement and the Council of Europe (Published on behalf of the 
European Movement by Hutchinson, 1949). 
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existing consensus among state parties to the Convention 
(consensualism), the Court has progressively applied what has been 
called a ‘teleological method’ of interpretation that amounts to 
addressing the substantive content of the rights.30 While I cannot 
retrace the precise evolution of its methodology, it appears that 
this substantive approach developed when the Court gained 
compulsory jurisdiction in 1998. In the following year, it for 
instance affirmed in Matthews v United Kingdom that ‘the mere fact 
that a body was not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention 
cannot prevent that body from falling within the scope of the 
Convention.’31 While such approach is (yet) not valid for all the 
rights of the Convention—the Court has for instance not 
delineated the contours of what ‘religion’ precisely amounts to 
and accords a wide margin of appreciation32, the Court has made 
a special effort in explaining the normative role of freedom of 
expression in a ‘democratic society.’  
 
 
!
30 The teleological approach has its origins in the Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties of 1969. The Court originally referred to the ‘object and 
purpose’ (Article 31(1) of the VCLT) of the Convention on the basis of the 
Preamble (and also Article 3 ECHR) that refers to the ‘common heritage of 
the political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ of the states parties. 
On this point, see George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for 
the International Lawyer,’ The European Journal of International Law 21, no. 3 
(2010): pp. 509–41. 
31 Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24833/94, 18 February 1999, §39. 
32 This is for instance the case of scientology. In Kimlya and Others v. Russia, the 
Court held that ‘the Court observes that the question whether or not 
Scientology may be described as a ‘religion’ is a matter of controversy among 
the member States. It is clearly not the Court's task to decide in abstracto 
whether or not a body of beliefs and related practices may be considered a 
‘religion’ within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention.’ Kimlya and Others 
v. Russia, App. Nos. 76836/01, 32782/03, 1 October 2009, §79. 
Alain Zysset – When the European Court of Human Rights speaks, What Should It Say? 
 173!
3.1. Freedom of expression 
Indeed, the Court established from very early cases on how 
free expression serves democracy. In the seminal Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, which pertained to the publication of the Little Red 
School Book encouraging young people to reflect on societal 
norms including sex and drugs, the Court held that ‘freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a 
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the 
development of every man (…).’33 The individual dimension of the 
right is therefore salient. However, since then the Court has not 
further specified this individual dimension. Rather, it has 
established (as a matter of principle) how freedom of expression 
benefits a ‘democratic society’ as a whole. To understand this 
relation, one should first capture the role that ‘pluralism’ plays in 
the reasoning: since the same Handyside v. United Kingdom, the 
Court routinely relies on the Preamble’s passage that ‘such are the 
demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no ‘democratic society’’34 to explain the 
importance of freedom of expression and extend its correlative 
duties. Indeed, to allow for an inherent pluralism to flow is clearly 
not enough to realize ‘democratic society’ in the Court’s view. 
Another general and more significant principle of the case law is 
that such freedom !
‘is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably 
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but 
also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society.’35!
!
33 Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, §50. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. 
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This is where one can start testing the Court’s principled 
reasoning against the tenets of Brettschneider’s value democracy. 
As explained in Section 2 of the article, value democracy 
combines two interests, one individual and the other collective, 
that are both derived from the same ‘reasons for rights.’ The 
individual interest in exercising moral powers implies protecting 
the expression of all opinions and beliefs without 
discrimination—even those views that blatantly deny that same 
equality to others. This individual interest resonates rather well 
with the Court’s widely established principle that ‘freedom of 
expression constitutes (…) one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for the development of every man (…)’ (my emphasis). In 
more recent cases, the Court also refers to ‘individual's self-
fulfillment.’36 In turn, the Court’s second established principle 
that freedom of expression ‘is applicable not only to ‘information’ 
or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive 
or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock 
or offend (…)’ can be viewed as embodying the doctrine of 
‘viewpoint neutrality’ in the U.S. context. !
Now it is one thing to establish those principles in abstracto, yet 
another to calibrate in concreto the situations to which they apply 
and therefore determine the extent to which one’s views can be 
‘offensive’, ‘shocking’ or ‘disturbing.’ The Court may indeed state 
those general principles but then retract itself (by granting a 
margin of appreciation) in the face of the lack of an existing 
consensus between members of the CoE. This is where a more 
fine-grain analysis of cases is necessary. I deliberately concentrate 
on the class of extremist political and religious groups. Those 
cases are particularly relevant because political or religious groups 
defending and promoting an openly illiberal and undemocratic 
agenda can reach a high number of citizens (as the American 
!
36 Gündüz v. Turkey, App. No. 35071/97, 4 December 2003, §37. 
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Nazi Party in Brettschneider’s account). Let me concentrate on 
the case of Gündüz v. Turkey, which pertained to the leader of an 
Islamic sect defending Sharia law on an independent Turkish 
television channel. The National Security Court of Turkey found 
that the defendant’s views violated the Turkish criminal code 
provision related to incitement to violence. More specifically, it 
held that the defendant !
‘describes concepts such as democracy, secularism and Kemalism as 
impious [dinsiz], mixes religious and social affairs, and also uses the 
word 'impious' to describe democracy (…). The Court is satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant intended openly to incite 
the people to hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction founded 
on religion.’37!
By relying on a particular religious doctrine as applicable to all, 
the defendant’s view—the political project it contains—implies 
denying freedom and equality to non-believers on which the right 
to freedom of expression itself relies. In turn, the National 
Security Court’s reasoning echoes Brettschneider’s prudential 
justification of value democracy, namely that neutralism runs the 
risk of turning into a Hateful Society in which discriminatory 
beliefs and practices ‘thrive in a culture of rights.’38  
In its review of Turkish courts, the Strasbourg Court first 
acknowledged that the applicant’s views can offend the Turkish 
people’s attachment to secularism: ‘the Court cannot overlook the 
fact that the Turkish people, being deeply attached to a secular 
way of life of which civil marriage is a part, may legitimately feel 
that they have been attacked in an unwarranted and offensive 
manner.’39 But despite those costs and the risk of a thriving 
!
37 Gündüz v. Turkey, §15. 
38 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, 168. 
39 Gündüz v. Turkey, §49. 
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hostility, the Strasbourg Court found that Turkey violated Article 
10. The main reason is that the Turkish court failed to consider 
the conditions in which those views were received in the debate – 
more precisely, that they were heavily counterbalanced: 
the applicant’s extremist views were already known and had been 
discussed in the public arena and, in particular, were counterbalanced 
by the intervention of the other participants in the programme; and 
lastly, they were expressed in the course of a pluralistic debate in which 
the applicant was actively taking part. Accordingly, the Court considers 
that in the instant case the need for the restriction in issue has not been 
established convincingly.40 
I suggest that by emphasizing the reception of the applicant’s 
view by the public (the other participants to the program), the 
Strasbourg Court points to the second (collective) interest that 
grounds value democracy, namely the state’s interest (on behalf 
on all the citizens) ‘in seeing that the viewpoints consistent with 
the values of free and equal citizenship succeed while those 
inimical to those values fail.’41 But as we have seen, the duty of 
persuasion does not only fall upon citizens. In other words, the 
Turkish court should not only have allowed those views to be 
held. It should have criticized those views based on ‘the reasons 
for rights.’ While the Strasbourg Court did not assess the case 
based on this criterion, it explicitly affirmed the incompatibility of 
Sharia law with democracy, which points to the expressive 
capacity of the Strasbourg Court itself: 
As regards the relationship between democracy and sharia, the Court 
reiterates that in Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey (…), 
it noted, among other things, that it was difficult to declare one's 
respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time 
supporting a regime based on sharia. It considered that sharia, which 
!
40 Ibid., §51. 
41 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, p. 80. 
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faithfully reflected the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, 
was stable and invariable and clearly diverged from Convention values, 
particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its 
rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervened in all 
spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious 
precepts.42  
Surely, one may say that the Strasbourg Court fulfilled half of 
its duty of ‘democratic persuasion.’ Indeed, the court merely 
criticized the view held but did not attempt (at least not explicitly) 
to persuade the sect’s leader to adopt the values of freedom and 
equality. But by both respecting viewpoint neutrality and by 
explicitly and principally criticizing Sharia law, one may conclude 
that the Strasbourg Court made good use of its expressive 
capacities. One legal remark is needed here: when one uses 
‘capacity’ in this context, one should not forget that the 
Strasbourg Court cannot ‘strike down’ domestic law as the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The international nature of the Court implies 
that it declares, but not enforces, its own judgments. The execution 
of judgments falls back on the state parties. Therefore, the 
capacities of the court are not coercive but only expressive and 
persuasive. Moreover, this expressive role is double: the court has 
to offer reasons not only to right-holders (individuals) but also to 
duty-holders (states). I come back to this distinction in Section 4 
of the article when I examine Brettschneider’s implication of 
international democratic persuasion.  
 
3.2. Freedom of religion 
Now what is distinctive of the model of value democracy is its 
extension to freedom of religion. That is, religious beliefs and 
practices should not be exempt from the principle of public 
!
42 Ibid. 
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relevance. I want now to show that this extension can help us 
questioning the Strasbourg’s Court judicial restraint on Article 9 
(freedom of religion) on which it has tended to accord a wide 
margin of appreciation. Value democracy applies to religion on 
the basis of the same ‘reasons for rights’: ‘some of these religious 
practices and beliefs are at odds with religious freedom itself.’43 
Brettschneider is fully aware of the special character of religion 
(e.g. its ‘insularity’). In treating it on a par with expression, value 
democracy puts in question the underlying thought that freedom 
of religion ‘is endangered whenever religious beliefs are burdened 
or changed.’44 For Brettschneider, in contrast, ‘abandoning the 
discriminatory or hateful aspects of religious doctrines is not 
tantamount to abandoning religions belief itself.’45  
For the Strasbourg Court, things are different. True, the Court 
has established a number of principles suggesting that religion 
and expression, given their centrality to ‘self-development’, are 
necessary to a well-functioning ‘democratic society’: ‘it is, in its 
religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to 
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life 
(…).’46 The exercise of inherent moral powers is here certainly 
implied. Further, the Court has derived the principle of viewpoint 
neutrality from that premise: ‘the State’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to 
assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which 
those beliefs are expressed.’47 So far, so good. But as indicated 
above, a key step of the Court’s review is when it balances those 
established principles with the arguments put forward by the 
!
43 Ibid., p. 147. 
44 Ibid., p. 145. 
45 Ibid., p. 158. 
46 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 25 May 1993, §31. 
47 Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03, 7 July 2011, §120. 
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respondent state party, which may terminate in the attribution of 
a margin of appreciation. This is seen in the much debated case 
of Lautsi v. Italy (2011), which pertained to the practice of hanging 
crucifixes in Italian classrooms. The applicants, a father and his 
two children, argued on the basis of viewpoint neutrality: 
The applicants contended that every democratic State had a duty to 
guarantee the freedom of conscience, pluralism, equal treatment of 
beliefs and the secular nature of institutions. The principle of 
secularism required above all neutrality on the part of the State, which 
should keep out of the religious sphere and adopt the same attitude 
with regard to all religious currents (…). By imposing religious symbols, 
namely crucifixes, in classrooms, the Italian State was doing the 
opposite.48 
In contrast, the Strasbourg Court (the Grand Chamber) found 
that such practice fell within the margin of appreciation left to 
state parties and thereby did not find a violation of Article 9. This 
is all the more surprising as the Chamber previously found a 
violation of Article 9 precisely by relying on the state’s positive 
duty of neutrality. To overrule the Chamber and justify its judicial 
restraint, the Grand Chamber listed a number of facts: the 
‘passive symbol’ of the crucifixes and its weak influence on 
pupils; the fact that the presence of crucifixes is not associated 
with compulsory teaching about Christianity; the pupils’ 
guaranteed freedom to wear religious symbols in class (such as 
headscarf); the fact that religious teachings were optional; and the 
absence of ‘teaching practices with a proselytising tendency.’49 In 
conclusion, the Court held that:  
!
48 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011, §47. 
49 Ibid., §47. 
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there was nothing to suggest that the authorities were intolerant of 
pupils who believed in other religions, were non-believers or who held 
non-religious philosophical convictions.50 
It seems to me correct to hold that the state did not actively 
promote a particular religious doctrine beyond the hanging of crucifixes 
itself. Irrespective of that active neutrality, the passive practice of 
hanging crucifixes seems to me at odds with the commitment to 
freedom and equality that form the basis of religious freedom – 
‘reasons for rights’ argument. Even if the facts were to point only 
to a weak influence on the formation of religious beliefs, this 
practice still gives one religious doctrine a widely institutionalized 
advantage over others and does not cohere with the state’s wide 
secular efforts. 
Further, in conformity with its duty of persuasion, the Grand 
Chamber should also have criticized the reasons provided by the 
Italian courts for preserving this practice. Indeed, central to the 
defense of the Italian Administrative Court (later confirmed by 
the Supreme Administrative Court) was the historical argument 
that the principle of secularism is inherent and was ‘born out’ of 
Christianity: 
it is easy to identify in the constant central core of Christian faith, 
despite the inquisition, despite anti-Semitism and despite the crusades, 
the principles of human dignity, tolerance and freedom, including 
religious freedom, and therefore, in the last analysis, the foundations of 
the secular State.’51 
While the Grand Chamber mentioned this passage in its 
review of Italian law, it did not address it in the balancing. To 
recall, democratic persuasion requires that courts qua state actors 
should not just rely on their power to strike down illegitimate 
!
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., §11.6. 
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laws. It also should and criticizes the reasons that presided over 
the adoption of those laws. Therefore, I want to argue that the 
Grand Chamber should not only have found a violation of Article 
9 on the ground of state neutrality. More subtly, it should also 
have explained that irrespective of the hypothesized historical and 
therefore descriptive relation between secularism and Christianity, 
secularism as a normative principle stands firmly on its foundations 
of the inherent moral powers of individuals—the ‘reasons for 
rights.’ In my view, the grounding of neutral principles 
(secularism) in historical considerations (Christian history) 
remains ambiguous. In other words, the Strasbourg ‘voice’ lost an 
occasion to defend the reasons and values that underlie basic 
liberal rights as the U.S. Supreme Court did in Lukumi. 
 
IV 
Democratic persuasion at the international level: 
what role for courts? 
In the precedent section, I showed how Brettschneider’s value 
democracy can help both illuminating the Court’s rights-
promulgation (on freedom of expression) and suggesting how to 
revise pans of its case law (on freedom of religion). As I explained 
earlier, the prima facie reason for screening the practice of the 
Court with value democracy is the founding role of democracy 
and its pregnant justificatory role in the case law. But if one wants 
to render justice to Brettschneider’s book, one should also view 
the practice of the international courts through the lens of his 
conclusive chapter entitled ‘value democracy at home and 
abroad.’ Indeed, however important the reception of its 
judgments is domestically, the Strasbourg Court remains an 
international organ established by an international organization 
(the CoE) on the basis of an international treaty (the 
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Convention). As Letsas puts it, being an international treaty – the 
objection goes—the ECHR lacks the attribute of legality, as we 
know it in municipal law.52 What quickly emerges from the last 
chapter is that while the content of the duty of democratic 
persuasion remains the same at the international level (equal 
citizenship), the identity and the function of the actor bearing this 
duty remains under-specified. For Brettschneider, the signing of 
an international human rights treaty or the discourse of 
governments are enough to count as instances of international 
persuasion. An important question is thereby left unanswered: 
should international courts (human rights courts, UN Treaty 
Bodies, but also international criminal courts) play the same 
expressive role as constitutional courts? And which values should 
they express qua international courts?  
 
4.1. Human rights law 
Let me first tackle the question of the function of international 
human rights law. Referring mostly to UN human rights treaties, 
Brettscheider claims that ‘because there is no international state 
that can threaten coercion, international law often relies on 
mechanisms of persuasion.’53 As a result, Brettschneider opens 
the class of expressive acts to the signature of international 
treaties or simply to discourses of governments. It is undoubtedly 
correct that international law in principle relies on states for its 
enforcement.54 But it does not follow that international law—in 
!
52 George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 31. 
53 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, p. 171. 
54 For instance. It has been advanced that seventy per cent of the Views 
delivered by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) established by the ICCPR 
are not implemented. For a recent analysis of the effects of the decisions of 
UN treaty bodies, see Rosanne Van Alebeek and André Nollkaemper, ‘The 
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particular human rights law—has not given rise to judicial or 
quasi-judicial organs empowered by those same states to 
promulgate what one may call ‘the reasons for international 
rights.’ This is not only true of the Strasbourg Court, which 
promulgates the reasons for rights and thereby attempts to 
provide democratic reasons to its subjects (states and individuals) 
as we have seen. Some UN human rights treaties (including the 
CEDAW to which Brettschneider refers) also have established 
quasi-judicial organs, namely Treaty Bodies, whose function is 
precisely to specify and hence potentially ‘express’ the content of 
abstract moral norms enshrined in treaties. The question is 
thereby whether those quasi-judicial organs—the ‘principal 
interpreters’55 of UN human rights treaties—should perform the 
same expressive function as domestic courts. 
Brettschneider rightly explains that such a project is ambitious 
and cannot be fully developed in a conclusive chapter. 
Nonetheless, Brettschneider seems to assume that the current 
quasi-judicial framework, namely Treaty Bodies, suffices to meet 
to the duty of democratic persuasion. It is true that the Views and 
Recommendations adopted by Treaty Bodies ought to 
authoritatively guide the states’ interpretation of human rights 
norms—‘the Views have a judgment-like quality.’56 They may 
even ask—similarly to constitutional courts—for structural 
reforms such the amendment or repeal of legislation, the 
reopening of national proceedings, the release of prisoners, an 
investigation to establish the facts, the restitution of property, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Legal Status of Decisions by Human Rights Treaty Bodies in National Law’, in 
Human Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy, eds. Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
55 Ibid., p. 358. 
56 Birgit Schlütter, ‘Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by the UN Treaty 
Bodies’ in Human Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy, eds. Helen Keller and Geir 
Ulfstein (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 266. 
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etc.).57 More importantly, they may optionally allow for an 
individual right of complaint (such as the CEDAW). As a result, 
the addressee of the rights-promulgation is not just states in the 
final report but also individuals in the procedure. But do Treaty 
Bodies thereby enjoy the same ‘expressive’ legitimacy as 
constitutional courts? Treaty Bodies are not judicial organs stricto 
sensu. International human rights law lacks anything close to a 
central supranational judicial organ for authoritatively 
adjudicating state-individual disputes similar to the one we have 
in constitutional or regional regimes. Moreover, the human rights 
experts forming Treaty Bodies are not constitutional judges. As a 
result, it would be worth asking Brettschneider about the criteria 
for an international human rights institution to count as an 
‘expressive’ agent with an identical ‘rights-promulgating’ function 
to domestic courts in a world deprived of a global sovereign.  The 
same question applies in fine to the Strasbourg Court too: despite 
its compulsory jurisdiction and the compulsory right to individual 
petition, the Court does not rule in the name of a supranational 
political community and rather offers ‘democratic’ reasons to 
states. As we have seen, the lack of consensus within the CoE 
justifies allocating a margin of appreciation as in the case of 
freedom of religion. Should international courts still affirm the 
same reasons for the same catalogue of rights or opt for an 
incremental approach—a form of ‘judicial diplomacy’ as in the 
case of the Strasbourg Court?58 
!
57 Van Alebeek and Nollkaemper, ‘The Legal Status of Decisions by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies in National Law’, p. 361. 
58 In the case of the Strasbourg Court, Madsen described the Court’s first 
fifteen years as a form of ‘legal diplomacy’: ‘a very measured legal development 
over the first fifteen years where the objective of providing justice to 
individuals was carefully balanced with both national and geopolitical interests.’ 
In Mikael Rask Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalization of the Strasbourg 
Court, in The European Court of Human Rights Between Law and Politics, eds. Jonas 
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It quickly appears that the argument for the ‘identity thesis’ 
between the national and international levels of right-
promulgation directly depends upon the more vexing question of 
the content of human rights norms. Surprisingly, Brettschneider 
replicates the values promoted domestically onto the international 
level: democratic citizenship. Surely, the extensive corpus of anti-
discrimination norms across human rights law support 
Brettschneider’s preservation of equality as one founding value of 
international human rights law. The egalitarian dimension of 
human rights norms has also been developed in the recent 
philosophical literature.59 Moreover, Brettschneider’s 
concentration of CEDAW is also understandable given value 
democracy’s deployment into the private sphere. But one may 
argue—in line with a still predominant literature—that what is 
valid for equality is not prima facie valid for democracy. Following 
a long Rawlsian tradition60, it has been maintained that the right 
to democracy does not fall within the class of human rights. In 
the more recent literature, Charles Beitz defends a ‘practical’ 
conception of human rights in which the right to democracy does 
not pass his first criterion, namely that the right protects a 
fundamental interest ‘across a wide range of possible lives.’61 In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Christoffersen and Mikael Rask Madsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 50. 
59 Allen Buchanan for instance argues that human rights ‘foster the public 
recognition of equal basic status for all in all society.’ In Allen Buchanan, The 
Heart of Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 88. 
60 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), Section 9. See also Joshua 
Cohen, ‘Is There a Human Right to Democracy?’ in The Egalitarian Conscience: 
Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen, ed. Christine Spynowich (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
61 Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 111. The two other criteria of human rights are their ‘advantageous 
protection by the state’ and their suitability for some form of ‘international 
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reaction to Beitz’ excessively ‘practical’ conception, human rights 
theorists have recently articulated a modified ‘political’ 
conception of human rights in which democratic citizenship and 
human rights contribute to the quest for political equality. In my 
view, this intermediary step is needed to support the ‘content-
identity’ thesis and thereby support Brettschneider’s assertion that 
‘democratic persuasion, far from being out of place at the global 
level, is at the heart of much international human rights law.’62 Let 
me articulate one suggestion below.  
The driving thought is that human rights and democratic 
citizenship have in common the fundamental premise of the 
equal moral status of individuals in their moral-political 
communities—a status that ought to be recognized before all 
public institutions (legislative, executive, judicial at the domestic, 
regional or international levels). This is how Samantha Besson 
(among others) understands the ‘point of passage’ from a general 
and fundamental interest to a human right: ‘the threshold of 
importance and point of passage from a general and fundamental 
interest to a human rights is reached, may be found in the 
normative status of each individual qua equal member of the 
moral-political community.’63 One may further develop the point 
with Rainer Forst’s reflexive argument that human rights protects 
and expresses the equal status of individuals as ‘agents of 
justification’ within any moral-political community – that is, 
human rights are all grounded in ‘a right to be recognized as an 
agent who can demand acceptable reasons for any action that 
claims to be morally justified and for any social or political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
concern.’ See Ibid., pp. 138–139. 
62 Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, p. 172. 
63 Samantha Besson, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Law: Patterns of 
Mutual Validation and Legitimation,’ in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao, and 
Massimo Renzo, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015),p.  282. 
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structure or law that claims to be binding upon him or her.’64 
Two important implications follow. First, the individuals’ equal 
interest in participating to collective decisions that affects them all 
is obtained. Human rights ‘generate duties on the part of public 
authorities not only to protect equal individual interests, but also 
individuals’ political status qua equal political actors.’65 This is 
where one can find the connecting thread between human rights 
and democratic citizenship that Brettschneider assumes. Second, 
the complementary relation between international human rights 
and constitutional law as forming the ‘dual-sourced sovereignty’66 
characteristic of international law post-1945 is also obtained. That 
is, human rights and constitutional rights operate as the basis for 
and the constraint on the self-determination of states. 
Interestingly, this relation is salient in the European context 
analysed earlier: the Strasbourg asserts its authority—leaving no 
margin of appreciation—by invoking the ‘democratic reasons for 
rights’ that places the conditions of the procedure of mutual 
justifiability to occur. This bridging link between human rights 
and democratic citizenship hopefully supports the ‘content-
identity’ that Brettschneider presupposes. 
 
Now there is a more general reason why Brettschneider’s 
neglect of the increasingly important international judiciary is 
puzzling: the structure of international law’s operation – in which 
courts promulgate and states enforce – fits Brettschneider’s 
central attachment to persuasion over coercion particularly well. 
Brettschneider mentions it (p.173) but does not account for the 
various international judicial organs to which it could apply. In 
!
64 Rainer Forst, ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to 
Justification: A Reflexive Approach,’ Ethics 120, no. 4 (2010): p. 719. 
65 Ibid., p. 283.  
66 Ibid., p. 280. 
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analogy to domestic courts attempting to convince individuals to 
conform to its founding values, international courts attempt to 
convince both duty-bearers (states) and right-holders (individuals) 
of conforming their beliefs and practices to the ideal of freedom 
and equality. I illustrated this structure in the European human 
rights context above: the Strasbourg Court is strongly promoting 
ideals of democracy and equality in trying to persuading their 
subjects (states and individuals) by offering ‘democratic’ reasons, 
while respecting those subjects sovereign rights of states—
through the principle of subsidiarity—in analogy to the state not 
seeking to prohibit citizens from expressing hateful views. In 
other words, the very function of the international judiciary seems 
particularly well-suited to incorporate the model of democratic 
persuasion. Let me pursue this idea in the context of international 
criminal courts below.  
 
4.1 International criminal law  
With a view to further extend the expressive function to 
international courts, I finally want to test value democracy against 
other another fast-developing body of international law, namely 
international criminal law and its various judicial organs: the ICC, 
the Special Tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, etc.) or just state parties to 
the Rome Statute (on the basis of universal jurisdiction). Legal 
and political theorists have recently tackled the question of the 
moral reasons in virtue of which international criminal courts 
ought to ‘pierce the veil’ of state sovereignty in order to 
prosecute, adjudicate and enforce international criminal law. In 
the criminal context, the question more precisely pertains to the 
nature and scope of the moral community to which wrongdoers 
(e.g. perpetrators of crimes against humanity) ought to answer 
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under a non-instrumentalist account of the criminal law.67 Here 
again, the world is deprived of a global political community to 
which wrongdoers could respond. The literature is rather divided. 
Anthony Duff for instance suggests that given the destructive 
effects of international crimes, ‘there is no basis left on which to 
identify a political community to which their perpetrator ought to 
answer.’68 The community cannot but be aspirational. Others 
argue that international crimes (e.g. crimes against humanity) are 
attacks on a substantive ‘human dignity’, the violation of which 
creates a universal moral community to which wrongdoers should 
respond. Crimes against humanity are distinctive crimes in that 
they ‘deny their victims the status of being human.’69 
I want to suggest that Brettschneider’s account of 
‘international democratic persuasion’ can help us delineate an 
alternative model of the expressive function of international 
criminal courts. Roughly put, the argument goes as follows: when 
the ICC’s prosecutor delivers a warrant of arrest (usually the first 
step of the procedure), it does not only re-affirm the inherent 
status of individuals odiously attacked (such as Renzo’s ‘dignity’) 
in the name of a universal moral community. While it cannot 
enforce the warrant, the ICC can also attempt to convince state 
authorities that a well-functioning criminal law system counts 
among the crucial standards to improve their legitimacy qua state 
authorities. More than expressing the dignity of the victims, 
therefore, international courts can persuade states of their crucial 
!
67 I refer here primarily to Anthony Duff’s accountability model. See Antony 
Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
68 Antony Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law,’ 
in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 598. 
69 Massimo Renzo, ‘Crimes Against Humanity and the Limits of International 
Criminal Law,’ Law and Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2012): p. 448. 
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role of providing their subjects with the guarantees of the 
criminal procedure, that is, that state authorities will use coercion 
(public prosecution, adjudication and enforcement) if and only if 
their subjects’ right to freedom and equality is seriously 
endangered. The ‘reasons for rights’ in the domestic, 
constitutional context become the ‘reasons for establishing a trial’ 
in the international, criminal context. What both have in common 
is a set of reasons that appeal to the founding values of liberal 
states, namely their subjects’ freedom and equality and the 
institutional arrangements that sustain them. 
Now how exactly the criminal law sustains the liberal state’s 
founding values need to be clarified in a further project. Malcolm 
Thorburn has recently defended the generic argument in the 
domestic context under a so-called ‘public law’ approach to the 
criminal law.70 This approach contrasts with the predominant 
‘legal moralist’ conception of the criminal law according to which 
the structure of the criminal law simply mirrors the moral 
relations that ordinarily take place in the private sphere. In 
Thorburn’s ‘public law’ account, in contrast, the basic function of 
the criminal justice system is not to enforce a particular and/or 
substantive moral view but to secure the individuals’ basic sphere 
of freedom and equality owed to individuals qua citizens; it is 
therefore ‘concerned with ensuring the institutional conditions 
within which it is possible to make moral choices without thereby 
undermining our own status as the equal of those around us.’71 In 
other words, the criminal justice system promises to enforce 
those conditions in the name of our basic moral equality: ‘the law 
focuses on each person's jurisdiction—the set of issues that it is 
!
70 Malcolm Thorburn, ‘Criminal Law as Public Law,’ in The Philosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law, ed. Antony Duff and Stuart Green (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
71 Ibid., p. 42. 
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up to them to decide—and the state promises to enforce the 
limits of jurisdiction in the name of us all.’72 Translated onto the 
international level, international criminal courts can make use of 
their expressive capacities and aim either to incite states to 
establish a well-functioning criminal justice system or persuade 
them that establishing international trials on behalf of an 
unwilling or/and unable state amounts to re-installing the role of 
the criminal justice system in the name of the founding value of 
equal citizenship.  
 
V 
Conclusion 
The expressive and persuasive role of courts a central 
requirement of Brettschneider’s model of value democracy. This 
article was an attempt to show the potential application(s) and 
challenge(s) of value democracy at the supra- and international 
level. The first part of was dedicated to the potential deployment 
of value democracy in the case law of the Strasbourg Court. My 
starting point was double: first, the applicability the duty of 
democratic persuasion is premised upon the founding role of 
democracy to the very establishment of this supranational court. 
Second, the Court has spilled a lot of ink specifying the role of 
liberal rights in a ‘democratic society’—an effort that reveals a 
significant expressive and explanatory dimension rather unique in 
international law. In my view, the teleological approach applied to 
‘democratic society’ amounts to expressing and explaining the 
‘reasons for rights’ in the vein of Brettschneider’s duty of 
democratic persuasion, which requires that state actors and the 
citizenry criticize but not prohibit viewpoints that are at odds 
!
72 Ibid. 
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with the values that justify protecting the rights in the first place. I 
illustrated how this core principle can illuminate the Court’s 
reasoning on freedom of expression and concentrated on 
extremist political and religious groups in order to test the limits 
of Strasbourg’s viewpoint neutrality. Moreover, I also showed 
how the Court in my view has failed to meet the duty of 
democratic persuasion on freedom of religion where the Court’s 
restraint (by way of allocating the margin of appreciation) remains 
salient. The critical potential of value democracy in this domain is 
therefore significant—and to my knowledge not accounted for in 
the theoretical literature on the Court.  
But if there is room to fruitfully exploit value democracy in 
Strasbourg, there is also room to identify potential challenges 
when it comes to extend the scope of value democracy within 
and beyond European boundaries. In the second part of my 
article, I aimed to help preparing the terrain for what looks like 
one of Brettschneider’s future projects. As it stands, the project 
seems to rely on an asymmetry between the function of 
international courts and the content of international norms. The 
first question I identified is whether the current quasi-judicial UN 
framework – namely Treaty bodies – ought to play the same 
expressive role as supreme domestic courts. The factual 
distinction lies in the absence of a global sovereign. Whether this 
distinction should impact on the function of international courts 
seems to be an important question for the extension of value 
democracy across international law. But the question of function 
is irremediably related to the question of content. On this point, 
Brettschneider pleads for a clear identity between the domestic 
and international levels in expressing the values of equal 
citizenship and human rights. While this connection is implicit in 
Brettschneider’s account, I offered a suggestion to make this 
connection clearer. Finally, I sketched how the core attachment 
to the courts’ persuasion could potentially develop in 
Alain Zysset – When the European Court of Human Rights speaks, What Should It Say? 
 193!
international criminal law. I relied on the same ‘reasons for rights’ 
argument, that is, how to persuade states to conform to values to 
which they owe their legitimate existence qua states. The 
institution of the criminal law is a necessary condition for the 
exercise of liberal rights. Therefore, the same reasons for rights 
can be reasons for having a well-functional criminal justice 
system. In that sense, value democracy cannot only fruitfully 
apply beyond human rights law but point to a more 
comprehensive account of the ‘expressive’ role of international 
courts. 
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